Abstract: The code of Hammurabi specified a "trial by surviving in the river" as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. This system is puzzling for two reasons.
Introduction
The first known written record of a mechanism is the code of Hammurabi. The second of Hammurabi's laws is "If any one bring an accusation against a man, and the accused go to the river and leap into the river, if he sink in the river his accuser shall take possession of his house. But if the river prove that the accused is not guilty, and he escape unhurt, then he who had brought the accusation shall be put to death, while he who leaped into the river shall take possession of the house that had belonged to his accuser." This law is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is based on the superstition that the guilty are more likely to drown than the innocent. Second, if people are this superstitious, why use such an elaborate mechanism? Why not simply assert that those who are guilty will be struck dead by lightning, while the innocent will not be? If this is believed, it will be as effective at preventing crime as the Hammurabi mechanism, and it does not require witnesses or judges or any of the other complicated and costly elements of the Hammurabi code.
Our perspective on these puzzles is that of the theory of learning in games. We argue that Hammurabi had it exactly right: his law uses the greatest amount of superstition consistent with patient rational learning. Using a model we developed in [1993b] , we imagine society to consist of overlapping generations of finitely lived players. These players are indoctrinated into the social norm as children -for example "if you commit a crime you will be struck by lightning" -and enter the world as young adults with prior beliefs that it is very likely that the social norm is true. However, the players are rational Bayesians, and are relatively patient, so when they are young they optimally decide to commit a few crimes to see what will happen. In the case of the lightning-strike norm, most young players will discover that the chances of being struck by lightning are independent of whether they commit crimes, and so go on to a life of crime, thereby undermining the norm. The Hammurabi case is more complex: the social norm is to not commit crimes; to only accuse the guilty; and to jump in the river when accused of a crime. If older people adhere to this norm, what happens? The young players commit crimes, are accused of crimes, jump in the river and are punished. Hence they learn that crime does not pay, and as they grow older stop committing crimes. But what about the young accusers? The critical fact is that the accusers only get to play the game after a crime takes place. As we have described the situation, there are few crimes, hence accusers only get to play infrequently. Infrequent play reduces the option value of experimentation, because there will likely be a long delay before the knowledge gained can be put to use. Hence even young accusers will not experiment with false accusations, and so they will never learn that the river is as likely to punish the innocent as the guilty.
To formalize this intuition, we consider the limit of the steady states of this learning model, as first the length of life becomes infinite, and then the discount factor approaches one; we call these the "patiently stable states." Our [1993b] paper showed that these limits are necessarily Nash equilibria, but being a Nash equilibrium is not sufficient for patient stability. The present paper's technical contribution is to refine this conclusion, providing a more restrictive necessary condition for patient stability that is also sufficient in the stylized "accusation game" that we use to illustrate the Hammurabi mechanism. Specifically, we show that, for the appropriate choice of priors, the Hammurabi mechanism does describe a patiently stable outcome of this game, but that the "lightning-strike" mechanism is not.
To see the impact of patient stability, consider a game with a single potential criminal and a single accuser. Player 1 moves first and may either exit or commit a crime. If player 1 exits the game ends; if he chooses crime, player 2 gets to move, and may either tell the truth or lie. Both players get 0 if there is exit. If a crime is committed, and player 2 tells the truth, player 1 receives a very low payoff, so that regardless of player 2's payoff function, it is a Nash equilibrium for player 1 to exit and player 2 to tell the truth. 3 We show that in patient stability requires that players act rationally one step off of the equilibrium path; if accusers have grudges against individuals other than the criminal, the Nash equilibrium in which they tell the truth will fail this additional test.
This test is useful also for dealing with a broader set of issues concerning off-path play.
For example, there may be several players playing in the subgame following a crime.
Patient stability requires that they learn each other's behavior, at least to the extent of self-confirming equilibrium.
To address the question of whether the Hammurabi mechanism is patiently stable, we
give for the first time a sufficient condition for patient stability: at each subgame reachable from the equilibrium path by a single deviation, play in that game must be a self-confirming equilibrium in the sense of our [1993a] paper. In particular, we show that the Hammurabi equilibrium satisfies this condition. In future work we expect to be able to show that for a broader class of games this condition is also necessary for patient stability. To complete our analysis of the Hammurabi games, we give a weaker necessary condition that fails in the "lightning strike" game.
The Hammurabi Games
Example 2.1: The Hammurabi Game
The Hammurabi game has two players, a suspect and an accuser. The suspect, player 1, moves first and may either exit or commit a crime. If the suspect exits the game ends. If the suspect chooses crime, the accuser, player 2, gets to move, and may either tell the truth or lie.
Both players get 0 if there is exit. If a crime is committed, and the accuser tells the truth, the suspect is thrown in the river, resulting in the suspect being punished with probability P and the accuser with probability P . If the accuser lies a falsely accused third party not explicitly represented in the game is thrown in the river and the accuser is punished with probability 1 p − .
If the crime is committed the payoffs depend on whether the accuser tells the truth and whether he is punished.
Accuser not punished Accuser punished
Here we interpret C as the social cost of the crime, which to keep the game simple, we have borne by the accuser. To avoid excess notation, we take the benefit to the accuser of a false accusation, or lie, B to be the same as the benefit of the crime to the suspect, and the cost of punishment P to be the same for both. We assume that " P0 so that the probability of punishment is sufficient to deter crime.
The game is illustrated in the extensive form below.
Example 2.2: The Hammurabi Game Without a River
In the Hammurabi game without a river is similar to the Hammurabi game, but there is no river. The suspect is always punished if the accuser tells the truth, and the accuser is never punished.
Example 2.3: The Lightning Game
In the lightning game there is no accuser, and the suspect is punished with probability P , regardless of whether a crime is committed or what the accuser does. Here we assume that " P0 so that the belief of certain punishment for crime is sufficient to deter crime. Each of these three games has an interesting configuration in which there is no crime. In the Hammurabi game the accuser tells the truth because he believes that if he lies he will be punished with probability 1. In the Hammurabi game without a river the accuser tells the truth, and is indifferent. In the lightning game everyone believes that if they commit a crime they will be punished with probability 1, and that if they exit they will be punished with probability P .
In the lightning game, the no-crime profile is a self-confirming equilibrium, since the information set for nature at which a crime is committed is not observed. 4 It is not a Nash equilibrium, since the suspect is not playing a best response to Nature's strategy.
Hence the lightning profile can be ruled out as socially stable. In the game without the river , the no-crime profile is Nash, but fails any test of off-path rationality by the accuser, who finds it weakly dominant to lie. In the Hammurabi game, the no-crime profile is again a Nash equilibrium, and it also passes the test of off-path rationality, but the beliefs of the accuser about his off-off-path play are incorrect. We will show that the no-crime profile is patiently stable in the Hammurabi game, but that the profile is not patiently stable in the game without the river.
Simple Games
This paper focuses on a special class of games where there is a straightforward necessary and sufficient condition for social stability. A simple game is a game of perfect information (each information set is a singleton node) in which each player has at most one information set on each path through the tree. He may have more than one information set, but once he has moved, he never gets to move again. The Hammurabi game with and without a river and the lightning game are simple games.
To begin we specify some notation. 8 T by requiring that the nodes or information sets be reachable with positive probability. We will also need to refer to the information sets that are reached with positive probability under T , denoted 8 T .
We now model the idea that each player has beliefs about his opponents' play (including the play of Nature.) Let I N be a probability measure over I 1 , the set of other players' behavior strategies. Throughout this paper we make the assumption that beliefs are independent, that is, that players do not believe that there is a correlation between how an opponent plays at different information sets, or how different opponents play. In our learning model, there will be many agents in the role of each player, and each agent will play a pure strategy, so that a state of the system will be a vector of R T is the exogenous distribution over Nature's move.
Since each player moves at most once along any path of play, there is a unique behavior strategy profile Q associated with any state R by Kuhn's Theorem. We say that player
Subgame Confirmed Nash Equilibrium
We turn next to concepts of equilibrium. Our first notion of equilibrium is that of self-confirming equilibrium -this imposes the minimal restriction that players should learn what happens on the equilibrium path. 
S is a best response to
It is important to note that this definition allows player I to rationalize each I S in the support of I R with a different beliefs. This is because in the steady states of our learning model, there will be many agents in the role of each player, and different agents may hold different beliefs. Note also that Nash equilibrium differs by strengthening (b) to hold at all information sets.
We strengthen Nash equilibrium through the refinement of subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium. This requires self-confirming equilibrium in subgames one-step off the equilibrium path. As we will show it corresponds to the steady states of learning procedures in which rational Bayesian players experiment with off-path play.
Definition 4.2:
In a simple game, node x is one step off the path of π if it is an immediate successor of a node that is reached with positive probability under π . Profile π is a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium and if, in each subgame beginning one step off the path, the restriction of π to the subgame is selfconfirming in that subgame.
Before turning to the model of steady state learning, we first illustrate the notion of subgame-confirmed equilibrium through some simple examples. First, it is interesting to contrast subgame-confirming with subgame perfection. In a simple game with no more than two consecutive moves, self-confirming equilibrium for any player moving second implies optimal play by that player, so subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium implies subgame perfection. The next example shows how this fails when there are three consecutive moves. The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is clearly for all players to pass. However we claim that (drop, drop, pass) is subgame-confirmed. It is obviously a Nash equilibrium, since player 1 is playing a best response to player 2's strategy of dropping. We must also have that drop, pass is self-confirming in the subgame beginning with player 2's move.
It is, since if player 2 drops, he does not see player 3's move, and so may believe that player 3 is dropping, even though this is incorrect. The point is that subgame perfection requires beliefs to be correct in all subgames; subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium requires them only to be correct on the path of the subgame that starts one step from the equilibrium path.
The next example shows that subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium is not equivalent to the requirement that the profile yield a Nash equilibrium at every node that is one step off of the path. Inspection of the game shows that in a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium in which player 1 drops out, player 3 must randomize, so in particular the equilibrium above, in which player 3 randomizes 50-50, is not path equivalent to a pure strategy subgameconfirmed Nash equilibrium, and that it is also not path equivalent to an equilibrium with Nash play at all nodes at most one step off of the path of play. In particular, the selfconfirming equilibria of the subgame starting with player 2's move that are consistent with player 1 dropping require player 3 to randomize.
The heart of this example is that there is a conflict between player 1's and player 2's incentive constraints, so that for them both to play as specified, player 3 must
randomize. Yet in a Nash equilibrium of the subgame starting with 2's move, if player 2 passes and player 3 randomizes, player 4 must pass, so 3 must pass with probability 1. 
Rational Steady-State Learning
The Agent's Decision Problem: We now consider an "agent" in the role of player i. This agent expects to play the game 4 times and wishes to maximize 
It is straightforward to show that non-doctrinaire priors imply non-doctrinaire posteriors.
Optimal Play: Let
6 G denote the maximized average discounted value (in current units) starting at I G with K periods remaining. Bellman's equation is
where I I 6 G and
The agent observes only his own play and the terminal nodes in games that he has played; the private history of the agent through time T is a sequence
. Let I 9 be the set of all such histories with length no more than An optimal policy is a map
Notice that there can be more than one optimal policy; for example several strategies may be strategically equivalent.
Steady States in an Overlapping generations model:
We suppose that there is a continuum population, with a unit mass of agents in the role of each player. There is a doubly infinite sequence of periods; generations overlap, so there are 4 players in each generation, with 4 new players entering each population each period to replace the 4 player who leave. Every period, each agent is randomly and independently matched with one agent from each of the other populations. In particular, the probability of meeting an agent of a particular age is equal to its population fraction 4 ; agents do not observe the ages or past experiences of their opponents.
We assume (by subdividing populations and adding player roles to the game if necessary) that each population has a common prior, and uses a common optimal rule 
This is a polynomial map from the space 4 of mixed strategy profiles to itself, and so has a fixed point. We refer to these fixed points as steady states. 
Patient Stability in Simple Games
This section presents our main results, and uses them to analyze the Hammurabi games that were presented in Section 2. To state these results, it is useful to define two profiles , θ θ′ to be path equivalent if they induce the same distribution over terminal nodes.
The first main result of this paper is loosely speaking that in simple games, a subgame-confirmed equilibrium is path-equivalent to a patiently stable steady state. To prove this, we must first rule out some types of weakly dominated strategy. The problem is illustrated by a simple two-player game "niceness" game.
Example 6.1 The Niceness Game
Player 1 moves first, either exit or in. If he exits both players get zero. If he plays in, player 2 can be nice or mean. Player 2 gets zero either way, but if he is mean player 1 gets zero, while if he is nice, player 1 gets one.
It is a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium, indeed subgame perfect, for player 1 to play in, and player 2 to play mean. But player 1 knows his payoff to exit is zero, and with non-doctrinaire priors, his posterior is non-doctrinaire, so he has a positive expected payoff relative to his posterior by playing in. So in any steady state he must This problem can be avoided assuming that there are no ties in payoffs, but this would rule out the Hammurabi game with a river, since the suspect only cares whether he is punished or not, and there are a number of ways he may fail to be punished. A weaker assumption is to assume that no player has two different actions at an information set that can possibly result in a tie in his own payoff. We require also that this assumption hold with respect to Nature's play. That is, we may convert a game with Nature's moves into a game without Nature's moves by moving all of Nature's moves to the end of the game and then replacing Nature's moves with a terminal node assigning the expected utility generated by Nature. In this game as well, no player should have two different actions at an information set that can possibly result in a tie in his own payoff. Notice that the first condition is satisfied for generic assignments of payoff vectors to terminal nodes, and that in a game in which the first condition is satisfied, the second is satisfied for generic assignments of probabilities to Nature. We refer to such games that satisfy both assumptions as having no own ties. This is satisfied in particular by the Hammurabi game: the ties are for the suspect, but all occur when he chooses to commit a crime, so two distinct own actions are not involved. Notice also that this assumption implies that a player playing in the final stage of the game has a unique best choice, and by backwards induction, every perfect information game with no own ties has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
We define a profile as nearly pure if Nature does not randomize on the equilibrium path, and no player except Nature randomizes off the equilibrium path.
Notice that our proposed Hammurabi game profile is nearly pure -only Nature randomizes, and only off the equilibrium path.
Theorem 6.1: In simple games with no own ties, a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium that is nearly pure is path equivalent to a patiently stable state.
The proof is in Section 7 below.
The following partial converse to theorem 6.1 will show that patient stability has very different implications in the games with and without a river.
Theorem 6.2: In a simple game, a patiently stable state θ is path equivalent to a Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies.
This follows from our maintained assumptions that priors are non-doctrinaire and independent. Non-doctrinaire implies that it will never be a myopic best response to play a weakly dominated strategy, and in a simple game with independent priors, a weakly dominated strategy has no information value. Notice that the theorem makes no assertions about iterated dominance.
Example 2.2 Continued: The Hammurabi Game Without A River
In the game without the river, it is weakly dominant to lie. The only Nash equilibrium where the accuser lies is (crime, lie) so Theorem 6.2 implies that in every patiently stable state a crime is always committed. Here patient stability and subgameconfirmed equilibrium coincide in the trivial sense of being identical to the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
Example 2.1 Continued: The Hammurabi Game
In the Hammurabi game, if the suspect exits, the only subgame that is one step off the equilibrium path is the game in which the accuser decides whether or not to lie. In this subgame, it is self-confirming for him to tell the truth, believe he will not be punished for telling the truth, and believe that if he were to lie he would be punished with probability one. So (exit, truth) is a subgame-confirmed equilibrium, and hence by Theorem 6.1, it is patiently stable. Moreover, (exit, truth) and (crime, lie) are the only subgame-confirmed equilibria, so the set of patiently stable states is path-equivalent to the set of subgame-confirmed equilibria.
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 6.1, we provide a sufficient condition for patient stability that does not use the restriction to nearly pure strategies. We will say that a game has "length at most three" if no path through the tree hits more than three information sets. In this class of games, we can give a sufficient condition for patient stability that does not use the restriction to nearly pure strategies
Theorem 6.3: In simple games with no own ties, no Nature's move and length at most three, a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium is path equivalent to a patiently stable state.
While the class of simple games with no Nature's move and length at most three is quite special, it includes many important games that have been extensively studied by experimentalists, including the ultimatum, bargaining, best shot, chain store, peasantdictator, and trust games.
We demonstrate below that under these hypotheses, every subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium is path equivalent to a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium in which players play pure strategies; the fact that players play pure strategies is what drives the sufficiency condition. Example 3.2 shows the role of the assumption of length at most three. That game has length four, and as we saw there is a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibria that is not path equivalent to a pure subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 6.4: In simple games with no own ties, no Nature's move and length at most three, a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium is path equivalent to a subgame-confirmed
Nash equilibrium in which players play pure strategies.
Our proof of this lemma uses the following result on self-confirming equilibria in games of length at most two:
Lemma 6.5: In simple games with no own ties, no Nature's move and length at most two, every self confirming equilibrium is path equivalent to a public randomization over Nash equilibria.
Proof: Fix a self-confirming equilibrium π , and let the first player be player 1. Each strategy that has positive probability under π is a best response to some beliefs about other player actions in all other subgames. In particular it is a best response to the beliefs that following every other action 1 s the player J that follows chooses the action that is worst for player 1 in that subgame; call these actions is a Nash equilibrium, so the self-confirming equilibrium π is path-equivalent to a public randomization over pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
ã Proof of lemma 6.4: Fix a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium of a game of length at most three. For each first-player action that has zero probability, specify that play in the resulting subgame will be one of the Nash equilibria that is worst for the first player moving. These continuation equilibria will be in pure strategies, and because the selfconfirming equilibrium specified for these subgames were randomizations over Nash equilibria, picking the worst Nash equilibrium will preserve the first player's incentives not to deviate. Finally, the assumption of no own ties implies that the first player cannot randomize, so the strategies we have constructed are pure.
ã Theorem 6.3 now follows from Theorem 6.1.
Proof of Theorem 6.2
We will now give the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.1: In simple games with no own ties, a subgame-confirmed Nash equilibrium that is nearly pure is path equivalent to a patiently stable state.
Let Q ) be a nearly-pure subgame confirmed equilibrium. Define a function on states (that is, distributions over strategies) as follows:
where 0 λ is the maximum of the difference between θ and π ) at any information set on the path of Q ) , and 1 λ is the same maximum over information sets one step off the path of
Now consider a θ such that
. Recall that ; = 4 F R is the play generated by the optimal dynamic learning rules in the environment defined by R when players live 4 periods, and that ; = 4 F R is the associated distribution over histories. In outline, our proof of the theorem relies on showing that there are (non-doctrinaire) priors such that the maps :
T f Θ → Θ map certain neighborhoods of Q ) to themselves, where the neighborhoods are defined by the λ − metric. We will conclude that the maps have a sequence of fixed points that converge to a suitable limit as T → ∞ . This limit need not be Q ) ; we only establish that the limit is path equivalent to it.
The proof uses a combination of new results specific to simple games and more general lemmas about rational learning and the law of large numbers, some of which are new and others we take from our previous work. This section states and proves the lemmas about simple games; the appendix collects all of the more general statistical lemmas, and gives proofs for the lemmas that are new.
Turning to the details of the proof, we will measure the distance between two beliefs of player i by the distance (in the sup norm) between their expected values, that is by the maximum difference in the probabilities assigned to any pure action at any node, and we will measure the distance between beliefs and the state R in the same way.
Since each I Q ) is a best response to I Q ) , and there are no own ties, each player's action at each information set on the path of Q ) is a strict best response to the actual play of the other players. Therefore there is an F such that each player's on-path actions are a strict best response to any i π − that is within ε of I Q ) at every information set. In addition, every player's actions at nodes one step off the path are also a strict best response to some strictly positive beliefs µ ) that support Q ) as subgame confirmed.
Moreover, there is such a µ ) , and a F % such that for any beliefs within F of N ) any action that is not an (ex ante) best response to Q ) has expected payoff relative to those beliefs of at least ε% lower than that of the best response.
We say that priors are , n ε -strong for a node x if fewer than n observations can not make the expected probability of actions at that node differ from N ) by more than ε .
. We say that priors are strong if they are strong at all nodes.
Since we are free to choose any non-doctrinaire priors in order to prove the lemma, we can specify that the priors come from the Dirichlet family. Specifically, we
is a Dirichlet distribution on the actions in ( ) A x with prior mean J X N )
and "initial intensity" ( ) x γ . Thus, when n observations have been acquired at x and observed play there corresponds to e X P , the posterior mean (i.e. expected play) at x is the mixed strategy e
.
Lemma 7.1: If priors are Dirichlet and strong on the path of
with 0 / 2 ε ε < , and all 4 E , the fraction of agents in ; = 4 F R whose beliefs about on-path play are more than ε from Q ) is no more than 0 / 2 ε .
Proof: Since beliefs are independent, player K learns nothing about the on-path play of other players at information sets that come after hers in periods in which she deviates from Q ) . Consequently, K 's beliefs about on-path play at any information set at any date N are obtained by using the M N b observations of that information set that are available from periods where she did not deviate. Since the posterior mean of the agent's beliefs will be a convex combination of the prior and the sample, and strong priors are within F of Q ) , whenever the sample is within F of Q ) , the posterior will be within F of Q ) as well. From the assumption of strong priors, we know that there is no sample path of length less than n that can make any player K 's posterior beliefs about J 's play be at least F from π ) . It is it is thus sufficient to show that, of the agents with samples of length n or more at node x, the fraction whose sample is more than F from Q ) is no more than 0 / 2 ε . Since θ is within F of Q ) , we will show that of the agents with samples of length n or more at node x, the fraction whose sample is more than F from θ is no more than 0 / 2 ε . This will follow from a version of the law of large numbers.
Since on-path play of Q ) is pure, there is a single terminal node So, regardless of 4 , at most 0 / 3 ε of the agents can have samples of length n or more that differ from θ at information sets on the equilibrium path by at least / 2 ε . successors of a to which the player assigns sufficiently low probability. 
That is, at any node ' x , only a few players (a) have seen that node be reached many times and (b) have observations that are substantially different from R . Moreover, the share of such players can be made small by taking N sufficiently large. In particular, this is true at every node that is one step off of the equilibrium path, and every feasible action A at such information sets. From that same lemma, for each node X , and any N and ' ε , there is an ' N such that the fraction of players who have played A more than ' N times and seen x fewer than N times is less than ' ε . Since X is finite, for any N and ' ε , there is an Proof: By lemma A.5, a player who believes that the chance of being at a node is small
will not experiment at that node. If the actual probability of being off the path of π ) , which goes to zero as F l , is sufficiently small, the fraction of the population who ever believes that it is large must be small, and hence most players play a best response to their beliefs whenever they are at these nodes. Lemma 7.4 shows that most have beliefs about one-step-off-path play less than 1 2ε ε < from Q ) . Since they have never experimented, a best response to beliefs is a best response to priors. 
Conclusion
We have shown that a patiently stable state must be path-equivalent to a Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies, and that in games with no own ties, a subgame-confirmed equilibrium is path equivalent to a patiently stable state if the equilibrium is near pure or if the game has length at most three. These results lead to sharp predictions in some games of interest, such as the Hammurabi, ultimatum, bestshot, peasant-dictator, and trust games.
We are working on an extension of our analysis to the more general class of "games with identified deviators." We conjecture that in these games only subgameconfirmed equilibria can be patiently stable. When combined with the results of this paper, the conjecture would imply that patient stability is essentially equivalent to subgame-confirmed equilibrium in the games we studied here. However, the result that every subgame-confirmed equilibrium is equivalent to a patiently stable state seems unlikely to generalize, which leaves open the question of determining a more restrictive necessary condition. Proof: We derive specific bounds based on the method of proof of the strong law of large numbers given by Billingsley [1986] . By Markov's inequality, That is,
I
9 F is the set of histories for player i such that Reference: Fudenberg and Levine [1993b] proof of Theorem 6.1 and Fudenberg and Levine [2003] Lemma D.1. The intuition for this result is that if node x has been reached many times, the "option value" of experimenting here is likely to be low, so that with high probability the optimal rule must prescribe an ε -best response. 
